相关论文: Sound Algorithms in Imperfect Information Games

This paper mainly investigates a class of distributed Variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium (VGNE) seeking problems for both online noncooperative games and online aggregative games with time-varying coupling inequality constraints. Two…

This paper investigates a resilient distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem on a directed communication network subject to malicious cyber-attacks. The considered attacks, named as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, are allowed to…

Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-information games and a game-theoretic approach. We study how one…

In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…

This work proposes an algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in noncooperative dynamic games. The focus is on cyber-physical systems with dynamics which are linear, stochastic, potentially unstable, and partially…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

This work investigates a problem of simultaneous global cost minimization and Nash equilibrium seeking, which commonly exists in $N$-cluster non-cooperative games. Specifically, the agents in the same cluster collaborate to minimize a…

In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…

This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…

Hannan consistency, or no external regret, is a~key concept for learning in games. An action selection algorithm is Hannan consistent (HC) if its performance is eventually as good as selecting the~best fixed action in hindsight. If both…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…

We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due…

Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…

Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect information games such as poker. This…