相关论文: Evolutionary game theory in mixed strategies: from…

We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

In this paper, I model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. I derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker…

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

In this paper we study the minority game in the presence of evolution. In particular, we examine the behavior in games in which the dimension of the strategy space, m, is the same for all agents and fixed for all time. We find that for all…

Mean field game theory studies the behavior of a large number of interacting individuals in a game theoretic setting and has received a lot of attention in the past decade (Lasry and Lions, Japanese journal of mathematics, 2007). In this…

Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…

Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…

We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…

Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynamical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent systems. In particular, it has been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi-agent…

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…

A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…