相关论文: Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma…

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of…

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…

The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma…

A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…

The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be…

We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…

We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…

A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…

For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither…

We will study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals using the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which…

We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…

We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…

The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players.…

We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

We present a detailed study of prisoner's dilemma game with stochastic modifications on a two-dimensional lattice, in presence of evolutionary dynamics. By very nature of the rules, the cooperators have incentive to cheat and the fear to…

I present the results from a spatial model of the prisoner's dilemma, played on a toroidal lattice. Each individual has a default strategy of either cooperating ($C$) or defecting ($D$). Two strategies were tested, including ``tit-for-tat''…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…