相关论文: You can do RLAs for IRV

Previous studies have shown that Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is highly resistant to coalitional manipulation (CM), though the theoretical reasons for this remain unclear. To address this gap, we analyze the susceptibility to CM of three…

The communication complexity of a voting rule is the worst-case number of bits that n voters must transmit to a central authority under the most efficient elicitation protocol in an election with m candidates. We study the communication…

BRAVO, the most widely tried method for risk-limiting election audits, cannot accommodate sampling without replacement or stratified sampling, which can improve efficiency and may be required by law. It applies only to ballot-polling…

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced to testing sets of null hypotheses of the form "the average of this list is not greater than 1/2" for a collection of finite lists of nonnegative numbers. Such…

We present Phrase-Verified Voting, a voter-verifiable remote voting system assembled from commercial off-the-shelf software for small private elections. The system is transparent and enables each voter to verify that the tally includes…

We present an approximate sampling framework and discuss how risk-limiting audits can compensate for these approximations, while maintaining their "risk-limiting" properties. Our framework is general and can compensate for counting mistakes…

From the perspective of social choice theory, ranked-choice voting (RCV) is known to have many flaws. RCV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner and is susceptible to monotonicity paradoxes and the spoiler effect, for example. We use a…

Presidential primaries are a critical part of the United States Presidential electoral process, since they are used to select the candidates in the Presidential election. While methods differ by state and party, many primaries involve…

We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance. It is intended to augment existing postal voting procedures, allowing a ballot to be electronically constructed, printed on paper, then returned in the post. It allows…

We study the limit CM rate of single-winner voting rules under Impartial Culture, defined as the probability that a preference profile is coalitionally manipulable in the limit of large electorates. For m = 3 candidates, Lepelley and…

The November 2014 Australian State of Victoria election was the first statutory political election worldwide at State level which deployed an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system in polling places. This was the first time blind…

ONEAudit provides more efficient risk-limiting audits than other extant methods when the voting system cannot report a cast-vote record linked to each cast card. It obviates the need for re-scanning; it is simpler and more efficient than…

We analyze how frequently instant runoff voting (IRV) selects the weakest (or least popular) candidate in three-candidate elections. We consider four definitions of ``weakest candidate'': the Borda loser, the Bucklin loser, the candidate…

We present a system for running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments. Votes are anonymous since the order of candidates on a ballot sheet is random. Tellers see only the position of the candidate. Voters can check…

Recent research on instant runoff voting (IRV) shows that it exhibits a striking combinatorial property in one-dimensional preference spaces: there is an "exclusion zone" around the median voter such that if a candidate from the exclusion…

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) aims to optimize policies that balance the expected reward and risk. In this paper, we present a novel risk-sensitive RL framework that employs an Iterated Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR)…

Overseas military personnel often face significant challenges in participating in elections due to the slow pace of traditional mail systems, which can result in ballots missing crucial deadlines. While internet-based voting offers a faster…

A collection of races in a single election can be audited as a group by auditing a random sample of batches of ballots and combining observed discrepancies in the races represented in those batches in a particular way: the maximum…

We propose a simple risk-limiting audit for elections, ClipAudit. To determine whether candidate A (the reported winner) actually beat candidate B in a plurality election, ClipAudit draws ballots at random, without replacement, until either…

Georgia was central to efforts to overturn the 2020 Presidential election, including a call from then-president Trump to Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger asking Raffensperger to `find' 11,780 votes. Raffensperger has maintained that…