相关论文: Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive …

Public blockchains group submitted transactions into batches, called blocks. A natural question is how to determine which transactions are included in these batches. In this note, we show a gap between the welfare of so-called `fair'…

In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. Consequently, traffic networks normally operate at an equilibrium characterized by Wardrop conditions. However, it is well known that equilibria are inefficient in…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…

In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that…

The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees…

We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the…

We develop new robust discrete choice tools to learn about the average willingness to pay for a price subsidy and its effects on demand given exogenous, discrete variation in prices. Our starting point is a nonparametric, nonseparable model…

The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…

We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…

We show that a large effective number of commodities can be a source of equilibrium stability and uniqueness: expanding substitution opportunities strengthens aggregate substitution effects. We study finite dated-commodity exchange…

There has been growing interest in increasing the amount of radio spectrum available for unlicensed broad-band wireless access. That includes "prime" spectrum at lower frequencies, which is also suitable for wide area coverage by licensed…

Some important results on the variance of the $M|G|\infty$ queue busy period are presented. Often, this parameter depends on the whole structure of the service time distribution. So, the importance of the bounds presented, depending only on…

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…

We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…

For single-commodity networks, the increase of the price of anarchy is bounded by a factor of $(1+\epsilon)^p$ from above, when the travel demand is increased by a factor of $1+\epsilon$ and the latency functions are polynomials of degree…

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…

In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…

In this paper, we propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multi-period stochastic framework with uncertain income streams. In an incomplete market, there exist two traded risky assets (e.g. stock/commodity and weather derivative)…