相关论文: Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive …

We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model involving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, we…

This paper proposes a novel framework to price energy storage in economic dispatch with a social welfare maximization objective. This framework can be utilized by power system operators to generate default bids for storage or to benchmark…

We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…

Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…

We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and…

We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…

The internet advertising market is a multi-billion dollar industry, in which advertisers buy thousands of ad placements every day by repeatedly participating in auctions. An important and ubiquitous feature of these auctions is the presence…

We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at…

We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…

In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities.…

The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and…

In traditional priority queues, we assume that every customer upon arrival has a fixed, class-dependent priority, and that a customer may not commence service if a customer with a higher priority is present in the queue. However, in…

Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…

Flows over time are a natural way to incorporate flow dynamics that arise in various applications such as traffic networks. In this paper we introduce a natural variant of the deterministic fluid queuing model in which users aim to minimize…

A dynamic model of collective consumption and saving decisions made by a finite number of agents with constant but different discount rates is developed. Collective utility is a weighted sum of individual utilities with time-varying utility…

Selective contests can impair participants' overall welfare in overcompetitive environments, such as school admissions. This paper models the situation as an optimal contest design problem with binary actions, treating effort costs as…

Large scale multiagent systems must rely on distributed decision making, as centralized coordination is either impractical or impossible. Recent works approach this problem under a game theoretic lens, whereby utility functions are assigned…

One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with…

We consider a discrete-time system comprising a first-come-first-served queue, a non-preemptive server, and a scheduler that governs the assignment of tasks in the queue to the server. The server has an availability state that indicates, at…

We consider the problem of scheduling a queueing system in which many statistically identical servers cater to several classes of impatient customers. Service times and impatience clocks are exponential while arrival processes are renewal.…