相关论文: Auction Algorithms for Market Equilibrium with Wea…

Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market…

In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…

We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while allocating a set of indivisible items to $n$ agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting…

Our main contribution is a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium for the Arctic Auction, which is the quasi-linear extension of the linear Fisher market model. We build directly on Orlin's strongly polynomial algorithm…

Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…

Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…

We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem with subadditive valuations accessible via demand queries. More generally, we propose a template for NSW optimization by solving a…

In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…

In this paper, inspired by the work of Megiddo on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis, we consider an early market model studied in the field of economic theory, in which each trader's utility may be influenced by the…

We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to…

We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…

Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…

We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…

In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…

We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the…

In this work we introduce a new class of mechanisms composed of a traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction and a fair division scheme, in order to achieve some desired level of fairness between groups of Bayesian strategic…

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…

For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis, food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand, aggregation systems have been extremely successful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g., Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply…

In this work, we study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem which seeks to form a price process endogenously by requiring it to balance the flow of sales-and-purchase orders in the exchange market, where a large number of…

The progressive second-price auction of Lazar and Semret is a decentralized mechanism for the allocation and real-time pricing of a divisible resource. Our focus is on how delays in the receipt of bid messages, asynchronous analysis by…