相关论文: Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auctio…

I establish nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. When the number of potential bidders is fixed and…

We establish nonparametric identification of auction models with continuous and nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity using three consecutive order statistics of bids. We then propose sieve maximum likelihood estimators for the joint…

This paper studies inference in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with many bidders, using an asymptotic framework where the number of bidders increases while the number of auctions remains fixed. Our approach enables…

This paper introduces a version of the interdependent value model of Milgrom and Weber (1982), where the signals are given by an index gathering signal shifters observed by the econometrician and private ones specific to each bidders. The…

We propose a semiparametric method to estimate the density of private values in first-price auctions. Specifically, we model private values through a set of conditional moment restrictions and use a two-step procedure. In the first step we…

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…

We propose a new nonparametric estimator for first-price auctions with independent private values that imposes the monotonicity constraint on the estimated inverse bidding strategy. We show that our estimator has a smaller asymptotic…

Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…

We study the identification and estimation of first-price auction models where bidders have ambiguity about the valuation distribution and their preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility. When entry is exogenous, the…

We focus on online second price auctions, where bids are made sequentially, and the winning bidder pays the maximum of the second-highest bid and a seller specified starting price. For many such auctions, the seller does not see all the…

In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we develop nonparametric estimators for several policy-relevant targets, such as the bidder's surplus and auctioneer's revenue under counterfactual…

We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of $n$ additive bidders whose values for $m$ heterogeneous items are drawn…

We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…

The paper proposes a parsimonious and flexible semiparametric quantile regression specification for asymmetric bidders within the independent private value framework. Asymmetry is parameterized using powers of a parent private value…

First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of…

Nonignorable missing outcomes are common in real world datasets and often require strong parametric assumptions to achieve identification. These assumptions can be implausible or untestable, and so we may forgo them in favour of partially…

We consider inference on the probability density of valuations in the first-price sealed-bid auctions model within the independent private value paradigm. We show the asymptotic normality of the two-step nonparametric estimator of Guerre,…

Bidding is a key element of search advertising, but the variation in bidders' valuations and strategies is often overlooked. Disclosing bid information helps uncover this heterogeneity and enables platforms to tailor their disclosure…

We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder's valuations, the bidder's ex ante expected surplus, and the…

This paper studies nonparametric identification in market level demand models for differentiated products with heterogeneous consumers. We consider a general class of models that allows for the individual specific coefficients to vary…