相关论文: The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Ele…

Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a…

We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We…

We consider the computational complexity of a problem modeling bribery in the context of voting systems. In the scenario of Swap Bribery, each voter assigns a certain price for swapping the positions of two consecutive candidates in his…

Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…

Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…

Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…

Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…

The bribery problem in election has received considerable attention in the literature, upon which various algorithmic and complexity results have been obtained. It is thus natural to ask whether we can protect an election from potential…

We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval…

We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…

In the Shift-Bribery problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred…

Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…

Previous work on voter control, which refers to situations where a chair seeks to change the outcome of an election by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters, takes for granted that the chair knows all the voters' preferences and that all…

We study the computational complexity of bribery in parliamentary voting, in settings where the briber is (also) interested in the success of an entire set of political parties - a ``coalition'' - rather than an individual party. We…

We continue previous work by Mattei et al. (Mattei, N., Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K.: Bribery in voting with CP-nets. Ann. of Math. and Artif. Intell. pp. 1--26 (2013)) in which they study the computational complexity of bribery schemes…

An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…

We provide an overview of some recent progress on the complexity of election systems. The issues studied include the complexity of the winner, manipulation, bribery, and control problems.

Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative…

We consider the problem of sequential evaluation, in which an evaluator observes candidates in a sequence and assigns scores to these candidates in an online, irrevocable fashion. Motivated by the psychology literature that has studied…

We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al.…