相关论文: No-boarding buses: Agents allowed to cooperate or …
We investigate a no-boarding policy in a system of $N$ buses serving $M$ bus stops in a loop, which is an entrainment mechanism to keep buses synchronised in a reasonably staggered configuration. Buses always allow alighting, but would…
We study how $N$ intelligent buses serving a loop of $M$ bus stops learn a \emph{no-boarding strategy} and a \emph{holding strategy} by reinforcement learning. The high level no-boarding and holding strategies emerge from the low level…
The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from…
We study the learning dynamics of agents who adapt to heterogeneous comfort levels in the context of an El-Farol type game, and show that even an infinitesimal degree of heterogeneity in the resource levels leads to a significant reduction…
We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…
The El Farol Bar Problem is a classic computational economics problem in which agents attempt to attend a weekly event at a bar only if it is not too crowded. Each agent has access to multiple competing strategies that may be used to…
We mathematize El Farol bar problem and transform it into a workable model. In general, the average convergence to optimality at the collective level is trivial and does not even require any intelligence on the side of agents. Secondly,…
We study a system in which N agents have to decide between two strategies \theta_i (i \in 1... N), for defection or cooperation, when interacting with other n agents (either spatial neighbors or randomly chosen ones). After each round, they…
We use symbolic dynamics to study discrete adaptive games, such as the minority game and the El Farol Bar problem. We show that no such game can have deterministic chaos. We put upper bounds on the statistical complexity and period of these…
We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed population of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non contingent mobility in the context of the…
Empty buses are standing at a bus station. $n$ passengers arrive, and they each board a bus completely at random (meaning that they choose uniformly and independently). Then all buses depart. We show that the more buses there are, the more…
Collective leadership and herding may arise in standard models of opinion dynamics as an interplay of a strong separation of time scales within the population and its hierarchical organization. Using the voter model as a simple opinion…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
We introduce a minimal model of multilevel selection on structured populations, considering the interplay between game theory and population dynamics. Through a bottleneck process, finite groups are formed with cooperators and defectors…
Bus systems involve complex bus-bus and bus-passengers interactions. We study the problem of assigning buses to bus stops to minimise the average waiting time of passengers, W. An analytical theory for two specific cases of interactions is…
We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can be cooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider…
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when…