相关论文: Capacity Games with Supply Function Competition

This paper is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two markets, e.g., a long-distance market and an…

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…

This work is concerned with the application of game theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power…

Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…

Energy storage can absorb variability from the rising number of wind and solar power producers. Storage is different from the conventional generators that have traditionally balanced supply and demand on fast time scales due to its hard…

This paper investigates inventory management in a multi channel distribution system consisting of one manufacturer and an arbitrary number of retailers that face stochastic demand. Existence of the pure Nash equilibrium is proved and…

We study the problem of online resource allocation, where multiple customers arrive sequentially and the seller must irrevocably allocate resources to each incoming customer while also facing a procurement cost for the total allocation.…

We revisit the classic Cournot model and extend it to a two-echelon supply chain with an upstream supplier who operates under demand uncertainty and multiple downstream retailers who compete over quantity. The supplier's belief about retail…

We study the effects of endogenous cost formation in the classic Cournot oligopoly through an extended two-stage game. The competing Cournot firms produce low-cost but limited quantities of a single homogeneous product. For additional…

A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…

Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system…

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

We study a general online combinatorial auction problem in algorithmic mechanism design. A provider allocates multiple types of capacity-limited resources to customers that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each customer has a…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design…

We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing -- a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach…

We discuss the problem of setting prices in an electronic market that has more than one buyer. We assume that there are self-interested sellers each selling a distinct item that has an associated cost. Each buyer has a submodular valuation…

We study the robust sequential screening problem of a monopolist seller of multiple cloud computing services facing a buyer who has private information about his demand distribution for these services. At the time of contracting, the buyer…