相关论文: Electricity Market Equilibrium under Information A…

We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy…

In two-stage electricity markets, renewable power producers enter the day-ahead market with a forecast of future power generation and then reconcile any forecast deviation in the real-time market at a penalty. The choice of the forecast…

In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which…

We formulate an equilibrium model of intraday trading in electricity markets. Agents face balancing constraints between their customers consumption plus intraday sales and their production plus intraday purchases. They have continuously…

Electricity markets typically clear in two stages: a day-ahead market and a real-time market. In this paper, we propose market mechanisms for a two-stage multi-interval electricity market with energy storage, generators, and demand…

We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…

When human agents come together to make decisions, it is often the case that one human agent has more information than the other. This phenomenon is called information asymmetry and this distorts the market. Often if one human agent intends…

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…

We investigate how asymmetric information affects equilibrium price formation in an economy with many interacting agents. Motivated by a finite-player model with two populations of asymmetrically informed agents, we study its mean-field…

We introduce a new microeconomics foundation of a specific type of competitive market equilibrium that can be used to study several markets with information asymmetry such as commodity market, credit market, and insurance market.

We investigate the profitability and risk of energy storage arbitrage in electricity markets under price uncertainty, exploring both robust and chance-constrained optimization approaches. We analyze various uncertainty representations,…

Renewable power sources have low marginal pro-duction costs, but may result in high balancing costs due to the inherent production uncertainty. Current day-ahead markets elicit only point production profiles and neglect the degree of…

Electricity is typically traded in day-ahead auctions because many power system decisions, such as unit commitment, must be made in advance. However, when wind and solar generators sell power one day ahead, they face uncertainty about their…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…

This paper explores the design of a balanced data-sharing marketplace for entities with heterogeneous datasets and machine learning models that they seek to refine using data from other agents. The goal of the marketplace is to encourage…

Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…

A minimal model of a market of myopic non-cooperative agents who trade bilaterally with random bids reproduces qualitative features of short-term electric power markets, such as those in California and New England. Each agent knows its own…

We present a simple, yet realistic, agent-based model of an electricity market. The proposed model combines the spot and balancing markets with a resolution of one minute, which enables a more accurate depiction of the physical properties…

This work presents a methodology for forward electricity contract price projection based on market equilibrium and social welfare optimization. In the methodology supply and demand for forward contracts are produced in such a way that each…