相关论文: Consensus and Information Cascades in Game-Theoret…

In this paper, we study the information propagation in an empirical blogging network by game-theoretical approach. The blogging network has small-world property and is scale-free. Individuals in the blogosphere coordinate their decisions…

This paper studies opinion dynamics in multilayer (social) networks. Extending a single-layer model, we formulate opinion updates as a synchronous coordination game in which agents minimize a local cost to stay close to their neighbors'…

Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any…

The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…

We establish average consensus on graphs with dynamic topologies prescribed by evolutionary games among strategic agents. Each agent possesses a private reward function and dynamically decides whether to create new links and/or whether to…

We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…

We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…

Contagions such as the spread of popular news stories, or infectious diseases, propagate in cascades over dynamic networks with unobservable topologies. However, "social signals" such as product purchase time, or blog entry timestamps are…

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…

This paper studies a consensus problem in multidimensional networks having the same agent-to-agent interaction pattern under both intra- and cross-layer time delays. Several conditions for the agents to asymptotically reach a consensus are…

We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games - the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game - played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of…

We analyze stability of consensus algorithms in networks of multi-agents with time-varying topologies and delays. The topology and delays are modeled as induced by an adapted process and are rather general, including i.i.d.\ topology…

In this paper, we study asynchronous consensus problems of continuous-time multi-agent systems with discontinuous information transmission. The proposed consensus control strategy is implemented only based on the state information at some…

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…

A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…

Distributed consensus protocols provide a mechanism for spreading information within clustered networks, allowing agents and clusters to make decisions without requiring direct access to the state of the ensemble. In this work, we propose a…

We introduce a mathematical model that combines the concepts of complex contagion with payoff-biased imitation, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on…