相关论文: The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games

We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_{\Delta}$ of a…

This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…

Collaboration may be understood as the execution of coordinated tasks (in the most general sense) by groups of users, who cooperate for achieving a common goal. Collaboration is a fundamental assumption and requirement for the correct…

Deterrence coalitions that collectively own their deterrence technology, need an institutional design to decide when to retaliate against an attack or incident. This choice of institutional design, formalized through a social choice…

Moral responsibility is a major concern in autonomous systems, with applications ranging from self-driving cars to kidney exchanges. Although there have been recent attempts to formalise responsibility and blame, among similar notions, the…

Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…

Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash…

We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency…

We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…

A formalized and quantifiable responsibility score is a crucial component in many aspects of the development and application of multi-agent systems and autonomous agents. We can employ it to inform decision making processes based on ethical…

The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…

In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game.…

We provide a formal framework accounting for a widespread idea in the theory of economic design: analytically established incompatibilities between given axioms should be qualified by the likelihood of their violation. We define the degree…

Malware attacks are costly. To mitigate against such attacks, organizations deploy malware detection tools that help them detect and eventually resolve those threats. While running only the best available tool does not provide enough…

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…

We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…