相关论文: Collective social behavior in a crowd controlled g…

Using a dynamic variant of the Vicsek model, we show that emergence of a crush from an orderly moving human crowd is a non-equilibrium first order phase transition. We also show that this transition can be reversed by modifying the dynamics…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

Social mobilization often fails not for a lack of collective interest, but because of fierce competition between rival movements for the same limited pool of participants. We generalize the classic threshold model of collective behavior to…

Many classical models of collective behavior assume that emergent dynamics result from external and observable interactions among individuals. However, how collective dynamics in human populations depend on the internal psychological…

Quantitative understanding of human behaviors provides elementary comprehension of the complexity of many human-initiated systems. A basic assumption embedded in the previous analyses on human dynamics is that its temporal statistics are…

Precise description of population game dynamics introduced by revision protocols - an economic model describing the agent's propensity to switch to a better-performing strategy - is of importance in economics and social sciences in general.…

Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…

Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…

A combination of a priority queueing model and mean field theory shows the emergence of traders' swarm behavior, even when each has a subjective prediction of the market driven by a limit order book. Using a nonlinear Markov model, we…

Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a…

A question of interest in both theory and practice is if and how familiarity between members of a team, expressed in terms of social network structure, relates to the success of the team in a given task. In this paper we revisit this…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoner's dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players…

The goal of this work is to study an infectious disease spreading in a medium size population occupying a confined environment. For this purpose, we consider a kinetic theory approach to model crowd dynamics in bounded domains and couple it…

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of…

Since its creation, the Location-Based Game (LBG), Pok\'emon GO, has been embraced by a community of fans across the world. Due to its recency, the impact of COVID-19 on the community of Pok\'emon GO players is underexplored. We address how…

For group-living animals, reaching consensus to stay cohesive is crucial for their fitness, particularly when collective motion starts and stops. Understanding the decision-making at individual and collective levels upon sudden disturbances…

We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…