相关论文: Indirect Mechanism Design for Efficient and Stable…

Several autonomous energy management and peer-to-peer trading mechanisms for future energy markets have been recently proposed based on optimization and game theory. In this paper, we study the impact of trading prices on the outcome of…

We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to…

Electricity markets typically operate in two stages, day-ahead and real-time. Despite best efforts striving efficiency, evidence of price manipulation has called for system-level market power mitigation (MPM) initiatives that substitute…

The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…

We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…

Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field…

The design of energy markets is a subject of ongoing debate, particularly concerning the choice between the widely adopted Pay-as-Clear (PC) pricing mechanism and the alternative Pay-as-Bid (PB). These mechanisms determine how energy…

The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for efficient coupling of independent electricity markets. The…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…

Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system.…

A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet,…

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…

Traditionally, most consumers of electricity pay for their consumptions according to a fixed rate. With the advancement of Smart Grid technologies, large-scale implementation of variable-rate metering becomes more practical. As a result,…

This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…

In contrast with existing works which rely on the same type of energy-efficiency measure to design distributed power control policies, the present work takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer at the transmitter side and…

In this paper, we propose a bilateral peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme under single-contract and multi-contract market setups, both as an assignment game, and a special class of coalitional games. {The proposed market formulation…

In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…

Efficiently accommodating uncertain renewable resources in wholesale electricity markets is among the foremost priorities of market regulators in the US, UK and EU nations. However, existing deterministic market designs fail to internalize…

Electric storage units constitute a key element in the emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the interactions and energy trading decisions of a number of geographically distributed storage units are studied using a novel framework…

The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…