相关论文: The strategy of conflict and cooperation

We study the problem of finding optimal correlated equilibria of various sorts in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), and extensive-form correlated…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as…

In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…

In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive…

In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody…

A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…

Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function…

Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…

Shared autonomy requires principled mechanisms for allocating and transferring control between a human and an autonomous agent. Existing approaches often rely on blending control inputs between human and autonomous agent or switching rules,…

In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…