相关论文: Computing a Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibriu…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent priors. This problem has been…

We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…

We propose a numerical algorithm for computing approximately optimal solutions of the matching for teams problem. Our algorithm is efficient for problems involving large number of agent categories and allows for non-discrete agent type…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct…

We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…

We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…

Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network, where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate…

We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…

Of paramount importance in both ecological systems and economic policies are the problems of harvesting of natural resources. A paradigmatic situation where this question is raised is that of fishing strategies. Indeed, overfishing is a…

We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming problems and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP)s. We remark that, when addressing bilevel problems, we consider the general case in which the lower level program is not…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

We design a computational approach to find equilibria in a class of Nash games possessing a hierarchical structure. By using tools from mixed-integer optimization and the characterization of variational equilibria in terms of the…