相关论文: Equilibrium solutions of three player Kuhn poker w…

We study a very small three player poker game (one-third street Kuhn poker), and a simplified version of the game that is interesting because it has three distinct equilibrium solutions. For one-third street Kuhn poker, we are able to find…

We study a simplified version of full street, three player Kuhn poker, in which the weakest card, J, must be checked and/or folded by a player who holds it. The number of nontrivial betting frequencies that must be calculated is thereby…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

Poker is a multiplayer game of imperfect information and has been widely studied in game theory. Many popular variants of poker (e.g., Texas Hold'em and Omaha) at the edge of modern game theory research are large games. However, even toy…

Poker is a family of card games that includes many variations. We hypothesize that most poker games can be solved as a pattern matching problem, and propose creating a strong poker playing system based on a unified poker representation. Our…

We study a type of generalized recursive game introduced by Castronova, Chen, and Zumbrun featuring increasing stakes, with an emphasis on continuous guts poker and $1$ v. $n$ coalitions. Our main results are to develop practical numerical…

Approximating a Nash equilibrium is currently the best performing approach for creating poker-playing programs. While for the simplest variants of the game, it is possible to evaluate the quality of the approximation by computing the value…

In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…

We compare performance of the genetic algorithm and the counterfactual regret minimization algorithm in computing the near-equilibrium strategies in the simplified poker games. We focus on the von Neumann poker and the simplified version of…

John von Neumann studied a simplified version of poker where the "deck" consists of infinitely many cards, in fact, all real numbers between $0$ and $1$. We harness the power of computation, both numeric and symbolic, to investigate analogs…

We consider a class of games with continuum of players where equilibria can be obtained by the minimization of a certain functional related to optimal transport as emphasized in [7]. We then use the powerful entropic regularization…

Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=6 or larger. We answer it positively for the remaining case…

We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…

We carry out a game-theoretic analysis of the recursive game "Guts," a variant of poker featuring repeated play with possibly growing stakes. An interesting aspect of such games is the need to account for funds lost to all players if…

We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…

In this article we consider a special class of Nash equilibrium problems that cannot be reduced to a single player control problem. Problems of this type can be solved by a semi-smooth Newton method. Applying results from the established…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…