相关论文: Designing virus-resistant, high-performance networ…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…
We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We study strategic network formation games in which agents attempt to form (costly) links in order to maximize their network centrality. Our model derives from Jackson and Wolinsky's symmetric connection model, but allows for heterogeneity…
Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…
We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks is considered. First, we study the problem of constrained distributed rate maximization, where user rates are subject to total transmission probability…
We investigate infection-curing games on a network epidemics model based on the classical Polya urn scheme that accounts for spatial contagion among neighbouring nodes. We first consider the zero-sum game between competing agents using the…
We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…
A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…
Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goya (2007), pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the…
The allocation of computing tasks for networked distributed services poses a question to service providers on whether centralized allocation management be worth its cost. Existing analytical models were conceived for users accessing…
We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…
As an alternative view to the graph formation models in the statistical physics community, we introduce graph formation models using \textit{network formation} through selfish competition as an approach to modeling graphs with particular…
In multicast network design games, a set of agents choose paths from their source locations to a common sink with the goal of minimizing their individual costs, where the cost of an edge is divided equally among the agents using it. Since…
We analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…