相关论文: Swap Equilibria under Link and Vertex Destruction

Asymmetry of in/out-degree distribution is a widespread phenomenon in real-world complex networks. This paper put forward the concept of Edge Asymmetry(EA) to quantify this feature. We designed an EA-based strategy to attack six kinds of…

In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…

Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents…

We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter…

In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…

The interplay between topology and dynamics in complex networks is a fundamental but widely unexplored problem. Here, we study this phenomenon on a prototype model in which the network is shaped by a dynamical variable. We couple the…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on…

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…

Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price \alpha > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game,…

Maximizing the damage by attacking specific nodes of the combat network can efficiently disrupt enemies' defense capability, protect our critical units, and enhance the resistance to the destruction of system-of-system~(SOS). However, the…

Transfer-based attacks craft adversarial examples on white-box surrogate models and directly deploy them against black-box target models, offering model-agnostic and query-free threat scenarios. While flatness-enhanced methods have recently…

Often an attacker tries to disconnect a network by destroying nodes or edges, while the defender counters using various resilience mechanisms. Examples include a music industry body attempting to close down a peer-to-peer file-sharing…

We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

Spatial evolution game has traditionally assumed that players interact with neighbors on a single network, which is isolated and not influenced by other systems. We introduce the simple game model into the interdependent networks composed…

We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…