相关论文: The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
Suppose that $n$ computer devices are to be connected to a network via inhomogeneous Bernoulli trials. The Shapley value of a device quantifies how much the network's value increases due to the participation of that device. Characteristic…
Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sustainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are…
This paper focuses on the fundamental challenge of partitioning input variables in attribution methods for Explainable AI, particularly in Shapley value-based approaches. Previous methods always compute attributions given a predefined…
The Shapley value has become popular in the Explainable AI (XAI) literature, thanks, to a large extent, to a solid theoretical foundation, including four "favourable and fair" axioms for attribution in transferable utility games. The…
A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor $a_{i=1,\cdots,N}$ disposes one unique good $g_{j=1,\cdots,N}$. Each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order from desired most to those…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining…
In this paper we introduce the $\Gamma$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $\Gamma$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players.…
Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic…
We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism, and…
Shapley values are great analytical tools in game theory to measure the importance of a player in a game. Due to their axiomatic and desirable properties such as efficiency, they have become popular for feature importance analysis in data…
We study the efficient computation of Shapley values for \emph{product games} -- cooperative games in which the coalition value factorizes as a product of per-player terms. Such games arise in machine learning explainability whenever the…
Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the…
Shapley values, which were originally designed to assign attributions to individual players in coalition games, have become a commonly used approach in explainable machine learning to provide attributions to input features for black-box…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
In 1953, Lloyd Shapley defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that competitive stochastic games have a discounted value. In 1982, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Mertens and…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e.,…