相关论文: Security Games in Network Flow Problems

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles…

Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

Flow scheduling tends to be one of the oldest and most stubborn problems in networking. It becomes more crucial in the next generation network, due to fast changing link states and tremendous cost to explore the global structure. In such…

We consider the classic motion planning problem defined over a roadmap in which a vehicle seeks to find an optimal path from a source to a destination in presence of an attacker who can launch attacks on the vehicle over any edge of the…

This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first…

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player,…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

Motivated by the controller placement problems in software-defined networks and the fair division principles of classical "cake cutting", we investigate the following two-player zero-sum game. In our model, a defender places a limited…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…

This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of $N$ transmission lines with initial loads $L_1, \ldots , L_N$…

We undertake a fundamental study of network equilibria modeled as solutions of fixed point equations for monotone linear functions with saturation nonlinearities. The considered model extends one originally proposed to study systemic risk…

Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective…

We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…

In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game.…

This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…