相关论文: The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations a…

We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…

We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we find that the effort of…

This paper proposes a distributed algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. Our method employs a distributed projected gradient play approach alongside consensus…

The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A…

We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the…

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…

We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the…

Autonomous artificial intelligence agents in negotiation systems must generate equitable utility allocations satisfying individual rationality (IR), ensuring each agent receives at least its outside option, and the Nash Bargaining Solution…

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…

The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, representing their ideological position on an issue. Each…

Artificially intelligent agents are increasingly being integrated into human decision-making: from large language model (LLM) assistants to autonomous vehicles. These systems often optimize their individual objective, leading to conflicts,…

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…

The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…

Building upon the results in [Hinterm\"uller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized…

We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

In approval-based budget division, the task is to allocate a divisible resource to the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. For this setting, Brandl et al. [2021] have shown that no distribution rule can…

Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…

We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy $\varepsilon$-Bayes-Nash equilibria ($\varepsilon$-BNEs) in combinatorial auctions with continuous value and action spaces. An essential innovation of our algorithm is to separate the…

We investigate Nash equilibrium learning in a competitive Markov Game (MG) environment, where multiple agents compete, and multiple Nash equilibria can exist. In particular, for an oligopolistic dynamic pricing environment, exact Nash…