相关论文: DValue for Boolean games is EXP-complete

We consider a zero sum differential game with lack of observation on one side. The initial state of the system is drawn at random according to some probability $\mu_0$ on $\R^N$. Player-I is informed of the initial position of state while…

In this paper we find viscosity solutions to a coupled system composed by two equations, the first one is parabolic and driven by the infinity Laplacian while the second one is elliptic and involves the usual Laplacian. We prove that there…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny…

Game coloring is a well-studied two-player game in which each player properly colors one vertex of a graph at a time until all the vertices are colored. An `eternal' version of game coloring is introduced in this paper in which the vertices…

It is proved that any polynomial vector field in two complex variables which is complete on a non-algebraic trajectory is complete.

The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $\epsilon$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in…

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

For a finite set $V\subset \mathbb{R}^n$, a set $T\subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is called $V$-closed if $t \in T$ and $v\in V$ imply that either $t+v\in T$ or $t-v \in T$. The set $P(V):=\{\sum_{v \in W} v: W \subset V\}$ is clearly $V$-closed and…

The total domination game is a two-person competitive optimization game, where the players, Dominator and Staller, alternately select vertices of an isolate-free graph $G$. Each vertex chosen must strictly increase the number of vertices…

First-order game logic GL and the first-order modal mu-calculus Lmu are proved to be equiexpressive and equivalent, thereby fully aligning their expressive and deductive power. That is, there is a semantics-preserving translation from GL to…

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…

We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…

We show that for any $\epsilon>0$, as the number of agents gets large, the share of games that admit a pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium converges to 1. Our result holds even for pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium in which all agents, except for at most…

We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This result extends previous results on…

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…

In this paper we find viscosity solutions to the two membranes problem (that is a system with two obstacle-type equations) with two different $p-$Laplacian operators taking limits of value functions of a sequence of games. We analyze…