相关论文: Cooperative Product Games

The Reward-Penalty-Selection Problem (RPSP) can be seen as a combination of the Set Cover Problem (SCP) and the Hitting Set Problem (HSP). Given a set of elements, a set of reward sets, and a set of penalty sets, one tries to find a subset…

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…

Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The…

We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…

We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…

This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…

Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…

This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…

This paper studies social cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…

Cooperative 2-matching games are a generalization of cooperative matching games, where the value function is given by maximum-weight b-matchings, for a vertex capacity vector $b \leq 2$. We show how to separate over the core of 2-matching…

This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition…

Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…

A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand…

A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…

In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…

This paper describes a basic model of a gift economy in the shape of a Giving Game and reveals the fundamental structure of such a game. Main result is that the game shows a community effect in that a small subgroup of players eventually…

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…

In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…

The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of…