相关论文: Equilibrium existence results for a class of disco…

In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result, unifying results such as the inverse isotonicity of M-matrices, Berry, Gandhi and Haile's identification of demand systems,…

In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…

For an ascending correspondence $F:X\to 2^X$ with chain-complete values on a complete lattice $X$, we prove that the set of fixed points is a complete lattice. This strengthens Zhou's fixed point theorem. For chain-complete posets that are…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…

We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…

A new class of projected dynamical systems of third order is investigated for quasi (parametric) variational inequalities in which the convex set in the classical variational inequality also depends upon the solution explicitly or…

We show how solutions to many recursive arena equations can be computed in a natural way by allowing loops in arenas. We then equip arenas with winning functions and total winning strategies. We present two natural winning conditions…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…