相关论文: False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games i…

We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…

The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…

Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…

We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…

The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected,…

Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…

We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…

For $f$ a weighted voting scheme used by $n$ voters to choose between two candidates, the $n$ \emph{Shapley-Shubik Indices} (or {\em Shapley values}) of $f$ provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome…

In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…

In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that…

The Banzhaf power index was introduced in cooperative game theory to measure the real power of players in a game. The Banzhaf interaction index was then proposed to measure the interaction degree inside coalitions of players. It was shown…

We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…

We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote…

The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the…

We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…

A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…

Many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation problems (which we will refer to in general as "manipulative actions" problems) are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been noted that many of these problems fall into polynomial…

Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting…