相关论文: Spatial Pattern Dynamics due to the Fitness Gradie…

In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…

We consider (N,r) games of predation with N species and r < N prey and predators, acting in a cyclic way. Further basic reactions include reproduction, decay and diffusion over a regular grid, without a hard constraint on the occupation…

The sustainable management of common resources often leads to a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons: individuals benefit from rapid extraction of resources, while communities as a whole benefit from more sustainable…

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…

Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…

Spatiotemporal patterns are often modeled using reaction-diffusion equations, which combine complex reactions between constituents with ideal diffusive motion. Such descriptions neglect physical interactions between constituents, which…

We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…

One could observe drastically different dynamics of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games under replicator equations. In zero-sum games, heteroclinic cycles naturally occur whenever the species of the population supersede each other in a cyclic…

We propose a novel framework for analyzing the dynamics of distribution shift in real-world systems that captures the feedback loop between learning algorithms and the distributions on which they are deployed. Prior work largely models…

Diffusion-driven flow is a boundary layer flow arising from the interplay of gravity and diffusion in density-stratified fluids when a gravitational field is non-parallel to an impermeable solid boundary. This study investigates…

We investigate the long time behavior of a passive particle evolving in a one-dimensional diffusive random environment, with diffusion constant $D$. We consider two cases: (a) The particle is pulled forward by a small external constant…

How coperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model…

We develop a description of diffusion limited growth in solid-solid transformations, which are strongly influenced by elastic effects. Density differences and structural transformations provoke stresses at interfaces, which affect the phase…

Recent studies in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games with reinforcement learning have shown that static agents can learn to cooperate through a diverse sort of mechanisms, including noise injection, different types of learning algorithms…

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…

Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of interaction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed. The modeling procedure is carried…

We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…

The classical idea of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) modeling animal behavior does not involve any spatial dependence. We considered a spatial Hawk-Dove game played by animals in a patchy environment with wrap around boundaries. We…