相关论文: Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local-I…

We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

With the growth of the internet it is becoming increasingly important to understand how the behaviour of players is affected by the topology of the network interconnecting them. Many models which involve networks of interacting players have…

We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model - the N-player evolutionary trust game - consisting of three types of players: investors, trustworthy trustees, and untrustworthy trustees.…

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…

We study a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its asymptotic behavior in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not know the game…

The asymptotic behaviour of deterministic logit dynamics in heterogeneous routing games is analyzed. It is proved that in directed multigraphs with parallel routes, and in series composition of such multigraphs, the dynamics admits a…

We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…

Whether it be in normal form games, or in fair allocations, or in voter preferences in voting systems, a certain pattern of reasoning is common. From a particular profile, an agent or a group of agents may have an incentive to shift to a…

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players.…

We develop a method based on computer algebra systems to represent the mutual pure strategy best-response dynamics of symmetric two-player, two-action repeated games played by players with a one-period memory. We apply this method to the…

Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…

We propose a fully asynchronous networked aggregative game (Asy-NAG) where each player minimizes a cost function that depends on its local action and the aggregate of all players' actions. In sharp contrast to the existing NAGs, each player…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

Wireless sensing and the internet of things (IoT) are nowadays pervasive in 5G and beyond networks, and they are expected to play a crucial role in 6G. However, a centralized optimization of a distributed system is not always possible and…

This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…

We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…

We study the influence of the complex topology of scale-free graphs on the dynamics of anti-coordination games (e.g. snowdrift games). These reference models are characterized by the coexistence (evolutionary stable mixed strategy) of two…