相关论文: Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Subm…

Resonance is a well-known phenomenon that happens in systems with second order dynamics. In this paper we address the fundamental question of making a network robust to signal being periodically pumped into it at or near a resonant…

Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…

Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each…

We consider the following interference model for wireless sensor and ad hoc networks: the receiver interference of a node is the number of transmission ranges it lies in. We model transmission ranges as disks. For this case we show that…

In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining…

In the light of energy conservation and the expansion of existing networks, wireless networks face the challenge of nodes with heterogeneous transmission power. However, for more realistic models of wireless communication only few…

In the classic online graph balancing problem, edges arrive sequentially and must be oriented immediately upon arrival, to minimize the maximum in-degree. For adversarial arrivals, the natural greedy algorithm is $O(\log n)$-competitive,…

We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…

We consider the problem of dominating set-based virtual backbone used for routing in asymmetric wireless ad-hoc networks. These networks have non-uniform transmission ranges and are modeled using the well-established disk graphs. The…

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…

We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s)…

We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per click to be a…

We study the design of truthful mechanisms for set systems, i.e., scenarios where a customer needs to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. In this setting, frugality [Archer&Tardos'02] provides a measure to evaluate the "cost of…

Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…

We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…

In programmatic advertising, ad slots are usually sold using second-price (SP) auctions in real-time. The highest bidding advertiser wins but pays only the second-highest bid (known as the winning price). In SP, for a single item, the…

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…

An online truthful budgeted matching problem is considered for a bipartite graph, where the right vertices are available ahead of time, and individual left vertices arrive sequentially. On arrival of a left vertex, its edge utilities (or…

We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing…