相关论文: Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Subm…

In this paper, we study the optimal secondary-link beamforming pattern that balances between the SU's throughput and the interference it causes to PUs in MIMO cognitive radio networks. In particular, we aim to maximize the throughput of the…

The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced many contributions in computer science under the umbrella of algorithmic mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms…

We study the optimal behavior of a bidder in a real-time auction subject to the requirement that a specified collections of heterogeneous items be acquired within given time constraints. The problem facing this bidder is cast as a…

In this paper we study the topological properties of wireless communication maps and their usability in algorithmic design. We consider the SINR model, which compares the received power of a signal at a receiver against the sum of strengths…

Resource allocation is considered for cooperative transmissions in multiple-relay wireless networks. Two auction mechanisms, SNR auctions and power auctions, are proposed to distributively coordinate the allocation of power among multiple…

This paper addresses the problem of resource allocation for systems in which a primary and a secondary link share the available spectrum by an underlay or overlay approach. After observing that such a scenario models both cognitive radio…

We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…

We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online based on the data observed in the…

Bilateral trade models the problem of facilitating trades between a seller and a buyer having private valuations for the item being sold. In the online version of the problem, the learner faces a new seller and buyer at each time step, and…

We study the online load balancing problem on unrelated machines, with the objective of minimizing the square of the $\ell_2$ norm of the loads on the machines. The greedy algorithm of Awerbuch et al. (STOC'95) is optimal for deterministic…

We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling $m$ items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we…

Low-rank pseudoinverses are widely used to approximate matrix inverses in scalable machine learning, optimization, and scientific computing. However, real-world matrices are often observed with noise, arising from sampling, sketching, and…

Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…

In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multiple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange one commodity. We show that there is no deterministic online double auction that is truthful and…

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…

We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with $m$ items and two subadditive bidders. A $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation can be guaranteed by a trivial randomized protocol with zero communication, or…

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…

Motivated by the recent efforts in extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum, we propose a novel spectrum sharing framework for the coopetition (i.e., cooperation and competition) between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. Basically, the…

In Part I of this paper, we proposed and analyzed a novel algorithmic framework for the minimization of a nonconvex (smooth) objective function, subject to nonconvex constraints, based on inner convex approximations. This Part II is devoted…