相关论文: A duality principle for selection games

Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…

Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize…

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

In a game where both contestants have perfect information, there is a strict limit on how perfect that information can be. By contrast, when one player is deprived of all information, the limit on the other player's information disappears,…

We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…

The Quantum Kolkata restaurant problem is a multiple-choice version of the quantum minority game, where a set of n non-communicating players have to chose between one of m choices. A payoff is granted to the players that make a unique…

We introduce variants of the Maker-Breaker and Waiter-Client games, which we call \emph{stotting}, in which a player grants a slight advantage to the opponent. We prove that a winning strategy in either stotting variant yields winning…

Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a…

We introduce the idea of a dining club to the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem. In this problem, $N$ agents choose (randomly) among $N$ restaurants, but if multiple agents choose the same restaurant, only one will eat. Agents in the dining…

A stylized experiment, the public goods game, has taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to contribute more to shared resources than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing…

Assume that a treasure is placed in one of $M$ boxes according to a known distribution and that $k$ searchers are searching for it in parallel during $T$ rounds. We study the question of how to incentivize selfish players so that the…

In coalitional games, a player $i$ is regarded as strictly more desirable than player $j$ if substituting $j$ with $i$ within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the value of certain coalitions, while preserving the value of the…

Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…

We study a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where a large number of individuals choose the game they want to play by voting. We show that it can be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own…

Distributed decision-makers are modeled as players in a game with two levels. High level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). Low level decisions involve the…

We present constructions regarding the general behaviour of biased positional games, and amongst others show that the outcome of such a game can differ in an arbitrary way depending on which player starts the game, and that fair biased…

We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…