相关论文: Cooperation under Incomplete Information on the Di…

Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act…

In real-world scenarios, individuals often cooperate for mutual benefit. However, differences in wealth can lead to varying outcomes for similar actions. In complex social networks, individuals' choices are also influenced by their…

Nash equilibrium (NE) assumes that players always make a best response. However, this is not always true; sometimes people cooperate even it is not a best response to do so. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, people often cooperate.…

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…

In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the…

The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

Combined prosocial incentives, integrating reward for cooperators and punishment for defectors, are effective tools to promote cooperation among competing agents in population games. Existing research concentrated on how to adjust reward or…

We study mechanism design settings where the planner has an interest in agents receiving noisy signals about the types of other agents. We show that additional information about other agents can eliminate undesired equilibria, making it…

We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…

We study a program game version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, i.e., a two-player game in which each player submits a computer program, the programs are given read access to each other's source code and then choose whether to cooperate or…

There is growing experimental evidence that $Q$-learning agents may learn to charge supracompetitive prices. We provide the first theoretical explanation for this behavior in infinite repeated games. Firms update their pricing policies…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in…

We propose to reformulate the payoff matrix structure of Prisoner's Dilemma Game, by introducing threat and greed factors, and show their effect on the co-evolution of memory and cooperation. Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory protects…

In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the…

We study a generic family of two-player continuous-time nonzero-sum stopping games modeling a war of attrition with symmetric information and stochastic payoffs that depend on an homogeneous linear diffusion. We first show that any…

Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committed demands are incompatible, then the current-period surplus…

We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…

We investigate how asymmetric information affects equilibrium price formation in an economy with many interacting agents. Motivated by a finite-player model with two populations of asymmetrically informed agents, we study its mean-field…