相关论文: Cooperation under Incomplete Information on the Di…

This report investigates the optimal design of event-triggered estimation for first-order linear stochastic systems. The problem is posed as a two-player team problem with a partially nested information pattern. The two players are given by…

In socio-technical multi-agent systems, deception exploits privileged information to induce false beliefs in "victims," keeping them oblivious and leading to outcomes detrimental to them or advantageous to the deceiver. We consider…

The standard iterated prisoner's dilemma is an unrealistic model of social behaviour because it forces individuals to participate in the interaction. We analyse a model in which players have the option of ending their association. If the…

Cooperation is the foundation of ecosystems and the human society, and the reinforcement learning provides crucial insight into the mechanism for its emergence. However, most previous work has mostly focused on the self-organization at the…

Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…

Cooperation and competition are fundamental forces shaping both natural and human systems, yet their interplay remains poorly understood. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) has long served as a foundational framework in Game Theory for…

An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…

An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…

The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) deals with the cooperation/defection conflict between two agents. The agents are represented by a cell of $L \times L$ square lattice. The agents are initially randomly distributed according to a certain…

In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose…

Financial markets investors are involved in many games -- they must interact with other agents to achieve their goals. Among them are those directly connected with their activity on markets but one cannot neglect other aspects that…

We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…

In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…

In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…

We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price…