相关论文: Congestion Games with Variable Demands

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…

After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game, where players have specific compact convex pure-action sets and nonsmooth convex cost functions, as a square-integrable function, we characterize a Wardrop equilibrium as…

Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system…

Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…

We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…

In this paper we propose a Bayesian game to allocate resources. In this game, there are $c$ units of resources to be allocated to $n$ players. Agent $i$ has a demand of $V_i$ units of resources and takes action $X_i$ according to a strategy…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…

We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…

Caching networks can reduce the routing costs of accessing contents by caching contents closer to users. However, cache nodes may belong to different entities and behave selfishly to maximize their own benefits, which often lead to…

For a set-valued function $F$ on a compact subset $W$ of a manifold, spanning is a topological property that implies that $F(x) \ne 0$ for interior points $x$ of $W$. A myopic equilibrium applies when for each action there is a payoff whose…

We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient approximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous…

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…

In mean-payoff games, the objective of the protagonist is to ensure that the limit average of an infinite sequence of numeric weights is nonnegative. In energy games, the objective is to ensure that the running sum of weights is always…

In this paper we propose and analyze a class of $N$-player stochastic games that include finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…