相关论文: Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via…

The concept of distance rationalizability of voting rules has been explored in recent years by several authors. Roughly speaking, we first choose a consensus set of elections (defined via preferences of voters over candidates) for which the…

The concept of distance rationalizability of social choice rules has been explored in recent years by several authors. We deal here with several foundational questions, and unify, correct, and generalize previous work. For example, we study…

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…

Proponents of Condorcet voting face the question of what to do in the rare case when no Condorcet winner exists. Recent work provides compelling arguments for the rule that should be applied in three-candidate elections, but already with…

We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In other words, if we assume that nodes vote on a…

A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet…

We consider a classical problem in choice theory -- vote aggregation -- using novel distance measures between permutations that arise in several practical applications. The distance measures are derived through an axiomatic approach, taking…

We study a family of distance functions on rankings that allow for asymmetric treatments of alternatives and consider the distinct relevance of the top and bottom positions for ordered lists. We provide a full axiomatic characterization of…

We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…

A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known…

We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of voting rules for participatory democracies. We first give algorithms which efficiently elicit \epsilon-approximations to two prominent voting rules: the Borda rule…

An assembly of $n$ voters needs to decide on $t$ independent binary issues. Each voter has opinions about the issues, given by a $t$-bit vector. Anscombe's paradox shows that a policy following the majority opinion in each issue may not…

We provide deterministic, polynomial-time computable voting rules that approximate Dodgson's and (the ``minimization version'' of) Young's scoring rules to within a logarithmic factor. Our approximation of Dodgson's rule is tight up to a…

The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently…

In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins…

Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…

In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names…

Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…

The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…

The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…