相关论文: Dodgson's Rule Approximations and Absurdity
This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates…
Despite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
In a district-based election, we apply a voting rule $r$ to decide the winners in each district, and a candidate who wins in a maximum number of districts is the winner of the election. We present efficient sampling-based algorithms to…
We define several different thresholds for election methods by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportionality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular, we reformulate the criteria known…
The wisdom of the crowd has long become the de facto approach for eliciting information from individuals or experts in order to predict the ground truth. However, classical democratic approaches for aggregating individual \emph{votes} only…
This paper proposes a dynamic research contest, namely chasing contest, in which two asymmetric contestants exert costly effort to accomplish two breakthroughs. The contestants are asymmetric in that one of them is present-biased and has…
We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…
We obtain a strong invariance principle for nonconventional sums and applying this result we derive for them a version of the law of iterated logarithm, as well as an almost sure central limit theorem. Among motivations for such results are…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
Defeasible rules are used in providing computable representations of legal documents and, more recently, have been suggested as a basis for explainable AI. Such applications draw attention to the scalability of implementations. The…
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made…
An important question for a probabilistic program is whether the probability mass of all its diverging runs is zero, that is that it terminates "almost surely". Proving that can be hard, and this paper presents a new method for doing so; it…
Liquid democracy with ranked delegations is a novel voting scheme that unites the practicability of representative democracy with the idealistic appeal of direct democracy: Every voter decides between casting their vote on a question at…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
We investigate majority rule dynamics in a population with two classes of people, each with two opinion states $\pm 1$, and with tunable interactions between people in different classes. In an update, a randomly selected group adopts the…
The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…
Crowdsourcing can solve problems that current fully automated systems cannot. Its effectiveness depends on the reliability, accuracy, and speed of the crowd workers that drive it. These objectives are frequently at odds with one another.…
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm combining the Douglas-Rachford (DR) algorithm and the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, also known as the conditional gradient (CondG) method, for solving the classic convex feasibility problem. Within the…