理论经济学
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations…
In this paper, we reveal that the signal representation of information introduced by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) can be applied profitably to dynamic decision problems. We use this to characterize when one dynamic information structure is…
Algorithmic pricing raises a question of interpretation as well as intervention: when autonomous deep-learning pricing systems sustain supracompetitive prices, what strategic pattern have they learned, and how might market institutions…
Macroeconomic dynamics is typically modeled under the assumption that the economy evolves according to a single invariant law of motion. This paper shows that this assumption imposes a structural restriction. We develop Dynamic…
We study a contest-theoretic model of adversarial investment in which an attacker and a defender allocate resources to AI-augmented capabilities across multiple attack surfaces. The attacker's investment operates through two channels: it…
Restricting individuals' access to some opportunities may steer their desire toward their substitutes, a phenomenon known as the forbidden fruit effect. We axiomatize a choice model named restriction-sensitive choice (RSC), which…
This paper studies general multi-unit probabilistic assignment problems involving indivisible objects, with a particular focus on achieving the fairness notion of equal treatment of equals (ETE) and satisfying various efficiency criteria.…
In the context of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, we show that bounded violations of the Pareto conditions characterize aggregation rules that are approximately utilitarian. When a single utility function is intended to…
We study stochastic choice across decision problems, each represented as a menu of action labels paired with observable outcome vectors. We propose a consistency condition for behavior in decision problems composed of two separable…
We study a model in which shocks propagate along a path chosen by agents embedded in a network. When a shock hits an agent, the affected agent cancels one of her outgoing edges. This cancellation cascades sequentially along a chosen path…
On platforms where time-to-contract is itself payoff-relevant--Aalsmeer's flower auctions, ride-hailing dispatch, on-demand-labor matching--the textbook revenue equivalence between Dutch and first-price formats holds the trading outcome…
Consider a social-choice function (SCF) is chosen to decide votes in a formal system, including votes to replace the voting method itself. Agents vote according to their ex-ante belief over what decisions are considered, and whether they…
A well-known feature of overlapping generations economies is that the First Welfare Theorem fails and equilibrium may be inefficient. The Cass (1972) criterion furnishes a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency, but it does not…
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…
We study a dynamic model in which a principal monitors agents based on historical data of infractions. This data informs when and at what intensity to monitor; the monitoring decision, in turn, selects the collected data, shaping the…
Strategic crisis analysis needs representations that combine qualitative expert judgement, explicit interdependence, and auditable update rules without requiring fully specified payoffs or probabilities. Scenario Bundle Analysis (SBA),…
A principal decides whether to approve an agent based on a noisy signal (e.g., test scores) generated by the agent. High-quality agents can produce high signals on average at lower cost, but the realizations are subject to noise that…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…
I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply…
Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets…