理论经济学
We study an Arrow-Debreu economy with externalities generated by multiplex networks. Market equilibrium prices reflect both the preferences and scarcity of goods, consumers' network centralities arising from goods' externalities, as well as…
This note shows how Condition 1 in Okumura (2025) can be tested efficiently using a standard graph-theoretic algorithm. It also describes an efficient implementation of Okumura's mechanism.
Standard dynamical systems approaches to economic modeling, such as those deriving the Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions from exponential growth trajectories, typically rely on integer-order differential equations. While effective,…
We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…
Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…
We extend the optimin notion of Ismail (2025) from mixed strategy profiles to correlated distributions. A correlated distribution is evaluated by the worst expected payoff each player can receive when opponents may either obey their private…
Westudy how a planner can design dynamic interventions to overcome status-quo inertia in living temporal games, where strategic agents control their state (active, sleep, partially dead) on a temporal network. Building on the…
We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
Many policy counterfactuals depend on how consumers value product attributes such as sugar, sodium, caffeine, alcohol, or emissions. Standard hedonic and differentiated-products models interpret these valuations statically. That…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
The social ranking is a recently proposed framework for evaluating the power of individuals according to the performance ranking of their coalitions. Although its origin can be traced to the classical power indices in simple games, social…
The increasing penetration of renewable energy necessitates improved power system flexibility, driving the deployment of independent energy storage operators (ESOs). Existing research extensively investigates capacity sizing for price-taker…
Health artificial intelligence (AI) adoption presents a paradox: point-solution tools diffuse readily through clinical populations, yet system-change AI, which carries the greatest potential for pathway-level transformation, consistently…
I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by…
We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of…
This paper introduces the theoretical framework for combining Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms with the Consensus Planning Protocol (CPP) to enable truthful and efficient collaboration between a retailer and vendors to lower joint…
We study a principal-agent problem with adverse selection, where the principal does not know the agent's true cost but must design a contract to optimize a specific criterion. Unlike standard screening frameworks that allow for…
This paper develops a theoretical model of platform competition where user-generated content (UGC) quality arises endogenously from the composition of the user base. Users differ in their relative preferences for content quality and network…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…