计算机科学与博弈论

Classification algorithms based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) are nowadays applied in high-stakes decisions in finance, healthcare, criminal justice, or education. Individuals can strategically adapt to the information gathered about…

Traffic is a significant source of global carbon emissions. In this paper, we study how carbon pricing can be used to guide traffic towards equilibria that respect given emission budgets. In particular, we consider a general multi-commodity…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

We study a temporal voting model where voters have dynamic preferences over a set of public chores -- projects that benefit society, but impose individual costs on those affected by their implementation. We investigate the computational…

We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods. We give a characterization of the instances where envy can be resolved by adding an arbitrary number of copies of the items…

Risk-aversion and bounded rationality are two key characteristics of human decision-making. Risk-averse quantal-response equilibrium (RQE) is a solution concept that incorporates these features, providing a more realistic depiction of human…

The problem of delegated choice has been of long interest in economics and recently on computer science. We overview a list of papers on delegated choice problem, from classic works to recent papers with algorithmic perspectives.

We study adaptive two-sided assortment optimization for revenue maximization in choice-based matching platforms. The platform has two sides of agents, an initiating side, and a responding side. The decision-maker sequentially selects agents…

We construct a symmetric, simultaneous, deterministic evolution game $SGo$, which is in a certain mathematical sense a symmetrization of the classical board game Go. $SGo$ is in some ways a simpler game than Go, as Komi, Ko and suicide…

We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…

In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…

The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…

We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…

The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…

Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…

In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…

We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…

We study information aggregation in networks when agents interact to learn a binary state of the world. Initially each agent privately observes an independent signal which is "correct" with probability $\frac{1}{2}+\delta$ for some $\delta…

We provide a geometric proof that the random proposer mechanism is a $4$-approximation to the first-best gains from trade in bilateral exchange. We then refine this geometric analysis to recover the state-of-the-art approximation ratio of…

The recent rise of renewable energy produced by many decentralized sources yields interesting market design challenges for electrical grids. Balancing supply and demand in such networks is both a temporal and spatial challenge due to…