计算机科学与博弈论

The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…

Independent media are central to democratic decision-making, yet recent technological developments, such as social media, pseudonymous identities, and generative AI, have made them more vulnerable to coordinated influence campaigns--usually…

Congestion pricing has emerged as an effective tool for mitigating traffic congestion, yet implementing welfare or revenue-optimal dynamic tolls is often impractical. Most real-world congestion pricing deployments, including New York City's…

Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed…

Consider a marketplace of AI tools, each with slightly different strengths and weaknesses. By selecting the right model for the task at hand, a user can do better than simply committing to a single model for everything. Routers operate…

We study Stackelberg (leader--follower) tuning of network parameters (tolls, capacities, incentives) in combinatorial congestion games, where selfish users choose discrete routes (or other combinatorial strategies) and settle at a…

Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…

We study budget aggregation under $\ell_1$-utilities, a model for collective decision making in which agents with heterogeneous preferences must allocate a public budget across a set of alternatives. Each agent reports their preferred…

We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…

It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…

This brief note clarifies that the scenario described in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2025) -- titled `Algorithmic Collusion without Threats' -- is not one of collusion, but one where one player is behaving non-competitively and the other is…

As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…

Real-world contracts are often ambiguous. While recent work by D\"utting, Feldman, Peretz, and Samuelson (EC 2023, Econometrica 2024) demonstrates that ambiguous contracts can yield large gains for the principal, their optimal solutions…

We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with $n$ agents and $m$ goods, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in…

We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current…

There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only…

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set $\{1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1\}$, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the…

The boundary of the firm is determined by coordination cost. We argue that agentic AI induces a structural change in how coordination costs scale: in prior modular systems, integration cost grew with interaction topology (O(n^2) in the…

We establish a general equilibrium theory for systems of large language model (LLM) agents operating under centralized orchestration. The framework is a production economy in the sense of Arrow-Debreu (1954), extended to…

Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal…