计算机科学与博弈论

Cyber warfare has become a central element of modern conflict, especially within multi-domain operations. As both a distinct and critical domain, cyber warfare requires integrating defensive and offensive technologies into coherent…

Modern open and softwarized systems -- such as O-RAN telecom networks and cloud computing platforms -- host independently developed applications with distinct, and potentially conflicting, objectives. Coordinating the behavior of such…

This paper presents scalable algorithms for computing pure Nash equilibria (PNEs) in large-scale integer programming games (IPGs), where existing exact methods typically handle only small numbers of players. Motivated by a county-level…

The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…

Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…

We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer…

Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…

In bandit settings, optimizing long-term regret metrics requires exploration, which corresponds to sometimes taking myopically sub-optimal actions. When a long-lived principal merely recommends actions to be executed by a sequence of…

I prove that competitive market outcomes require computational intractability. If P = NP, firms can efficiently solve the collusion detection problem, identifying deviations from cooperative agreements in complex, noisy markets and thereby…

Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in…

The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…

Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents' preferences. Taking a game-theoretic perspective, we study budget-aggregation games where each…

Epidemiological models increasingly rely on self-reported behavioral data such as vaccination status, mask usage, and social distancing adherence to forecast disease transmission and assess the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions…

Computational social choice (COMSOC) studies principled ways to aggregate conflicting individual preferences into collective decisions. In this paper, we call for an increased effort towards Computational Social Choice: Research &…

This paper studies the efficiency of battery storage operations in electricity markets by comparing the social welfare gain achieved by a central planner to that of a decentralized profit-maximizing operator. The problem is formulated in a…

The transition to auto-bidding in online advertising has shifted the focus of auction theory from quasi-linear utility maximization to value maximization subject to financial constraints. We study mechanism design for buyers with private…

Network formation theory studies how agents create and maintain relationships, and the stability of those relationships with respect to individual incentives. A central stability concept in this literature is pairwise stability, introduced…

Spatial public goods games are characterized by high-dimensional state spaces and localized externalities, which pose significant challenges for achieving stable and widespread cooperation. Traditional approaches often struggle to…

We initiate the study of control in hedonic games, where an external actor influences coalition formation by adding or deleting agents. We consider three basic control goals (1) enforcing that an agent is not alone (NA); (2) enforcing that…