计算机科学与博弈论

A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. To overcome this obstacle, we take inspiration from…

With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…

A new combinatorial game is given. It generalizes both Substraction and Nim. It is proved the computation of Nash equilibrium points in this new game is NP-hard.

A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…

The present bias is a well-documented behavioral trait that significantly influences human decision-making, with present-biased agents often prioritizing immediate rewards over long-term benefits, leading to suboptimal outcomes in various…

Web 3.0 is regarded as a revolutionary paradigm that enables users to securely manage data without a centralized authority. Blockchains, which enable data to be managed in a decentralized and transparent manner, are key technologies for…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible resources under the connectivity constraints of a graph $G$. This model, initially introduced by Bouveret et al. (published in IJCAI, 2017), effectively encompasses a diverse array of scenarios…

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov…

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…

A proper mechanism design can help federated learning (FL) to achieve good social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients through the learning process. However, existing mechanisms neglect the network effects of client…

We introduce Contested Logistics Games, a variant of logistics problems that account for the presence of an adversary that can disrupt the movement of goods in selected areas. We model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game…

Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…

The classic house allocation problem involves assigning $m$ houses to $n$ agents based on their utility functions, ensuring each agent receives exactly one house. A key criterion in these problems is satisfying fairness constraints such as…

Issues of inequity in U.S. high schools' course scheduling did not previously exist. However, in recent years, with the increase in student population and course variety, students perceive that the course scheduling method is unfair.…

Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social dilemmas such as natural resource consumption, behaviors in…

The main result of this paper is an almost approximation-preserving polynomial-time reduction from the most general multi-parameter Bayesian contract design (BCD) to single-parameter BCD. That is, for any multi-parameter BCD instance $I^M$,…

Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…

Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…

In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…