Related papers: TU-games with utilities: the prenucleolus and its …
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the…
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated…
In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash…
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…
We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity,…
The main stream of the literature in cooperative game theory considers games as being deterministic. In this survey, we review the main models incorporating uncertainty in cooperative games, starting from the seminal paper of Charnes and…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem for infinite TU-games with and without restricted…
We generalize the notion of convexity and average-convexity to the notion of weighted average-convexity. We show several results on the relation between weighted average-convexity and cooperative games. First, we prove that if a game is…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
We study an extension of modal $\mu$-calculus to sets with atoms and we study its basic properties. Model checking is decidable on orbit-finite structures, and a correspondence to parity games holds. On the other hand, satisfiability…
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…