On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-02-09 v1 Optimization and Control
Abstract
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2402.05891,
title = {On benefits of cooperation under strategic power},
author = {M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro and Ignacio García-Jurado and Ana Meca and Manuel A. Mosquera},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.05891},
year = {2024}
}