A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-08-13 v1 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
In this note we develop a generalisation of the -Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised -Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised -Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2408.06086,
title = {A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games},
author = {Subhadip Chakrabarti and Robert P Gilles and Lina Mallozzi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.06086},
year = {2024}
}