A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: some new axiomatization results
Theoretical Economics
2024-10-01 v2
Abstract
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the {\em entire} class of such games: i.e., restrictions like "non-levelness" or "balancedness" are not required.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2208.01690,
title = {A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: some new axiomatization results},
author = {Anindya Bhattacharya},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.01690},
year = {2024}
}