Related papers: A look back at the core of games in characteristic…
We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands…
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games,…
We introduce a way to parameterize automata and games on finite graphs with natural numbers. The parameters are accessed essentially by allowing counting down from the parameter value to 0 and branching depending on whether 0 has been…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
We study the core of normal form games with a continuum of players and without side payments. We consider the weak-core concept, which is an approximation of the core, introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. For payoffs depending on the…
In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier)…
In this paper the set of value functions of all-possible zero-sum differential games with terminal payoff is characterized. The necessary and sufficient condition for a given function to be a value of some differential game with terminal…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
We introduce the novel notion of winning cores in parity games and develop a deterministic polynomial-time under-approximation algorithm for solving parity games based on winning core approximation. Underlying this algorithm are a number…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
Axioms are presented which encapsulate the properties satisfied by categories of games which form the basis of results on full abstraction for PCF and other programming languages, and on full completeness for various logics and type…
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
The present paper introduces a novel notion of `(effective) computability', called viability, of strategies in game semantics in an intrinsic (i.e., without recourse to the standard Church-Turing computability), non-inductive and…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…