Path coalitional games
Abstract
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it can enable an s-t path. We present polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games and their duals, thereby settling a number of open problems. The least core payoffs of path coalitional games are completely characterized and a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of edge path coalitional games on undirected series-parallel graphs is presented.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1103.3310,
title = {Path coalitional games},
author = {Haris Aziz and Troels Bjerre Sørensen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1103.3310},
year = {2011}
}
Comments
15 pages; To be presented at The Second Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems (COOPMAS 2011)